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The US economy has slowed in recent quarters. It has 
mainly been affected by the weakness of global economic 
activity and, domestically, by the exhaustion of the fiscal 
stimuli. Given the economy’s weight internationally, it is 
worth assessing to what extent the slowdown is likely to 
step up in the coming quarters. In this connection, this 
box describes the main pillars that would underpin growth 
in this economy in the short term, the main risks and 
vulnerabilities it faces and the economic policy headroom 
available to attempt to mitigate any further downturn in 
activity.
Over the past year US GDP growth has slowed from a 
year-on-year rate of around 3% to approximately 2%. This 
is a very similar rate to that of potential growth, estimated 
by the Federal Reserve to be 1.9% (see Chart  1.1). 
Headway in the US economy over this period has rested 
essentially on the buoyancy of private consumption (see 
Chart 1.2), to which the increases in household income 
and wealth have been conducive. Specifically, favourable 
labour market developments in recent years have 
prompted an increase in household income owing to the 
rise in both employment and wages, which have outgrown 
inflation (see Chart  1.3). Looking ahead, signs of job 
creation easing are discernible. But it is likely that the pace 
of this variable will suffice to accommodate further 
additions of workers to the labour force and thus hold the 
unemployment rate at historical lows. Other indicators 
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also point to the soundness of the labour market in the 
short term, such as the low number of dismissals and the 
high number of employees voluntarily terminating their 
contracts. Moreover, net household wealth has recently hit 
new highs thanks to property and equity price appreciation, 
while the ongoing household debt deleveraging initiated in 
the wake of the financial crisis has taken root. Conversely, 
one factor offering less support to future household 
spending might be the low level of the saving rate which, 
nonetheless, has risen slightly in the most recent phase, 
after reaching historical lows.  
Set against the strength of consumption, business 
investment and the external sector have recently shown 
signs of weakness. If these were to continue in the coming 
quarters, they might feed through to employment and 
consumption dynamics.1 In the case of investment, the 
persistent escalation of trade tensions and the global 
economic slowdown have prompted a worsening of 
business expectations. That has weighed down 
investment, especially in capital goods, an item which has 
been greatly affected by the adverse impact exerted by 
the slowdown in world trade on the manufacturing sector 
(see Chart 1.4). Further, the fall in oil prices is estimated to 
have contributed to the recent sluggishness of investment 
in oil extraction. Aside from these global factors, the 
increase in real labour costs and the reduction in business 
mark-ups might also be negatively affecting the dynamism 
of investment.2 
As to the external sector, the across-the-board weakness 
of world trade and escalating protectionist tensions have 
notably harmed US exports, which is expected to have 
contributed to the worsening observed in the trade and 
current account balance. The current account deficit is, at 
present, close to 3% of GDP. That is around 0.5 pp higher 
than the level prevailing ahead of the start of the global 
trade slowdown and of the application of protectionist 
measures by the Trump administration and which, on IMF 
calculations, is even further off the level that its 
fundamentals would warrant.3 
Taken as a whole, the information available suggests that 
the US economy is already in a more mature phase of the 
cycle while the global economic weakness and some 
persistent sources of uncertainty such as the trade 
tensions might be penalising its dynamism. Yet the 
strength of the determinants of private consumption and, 
in particular, of the labour market would not indicate that 
the recent slowdown in activity were going to step up 
significantly in the short term.4 In this respect, the Federal 
Reserve’s forecasts signal that GDP growth in 2020 (2%) 
will only be slightly down on the rate expected for 2019 
(2.2%).
Tellingly, however, the US economy has, during the current 
expansion, built up certain vulnerabilities that might 
influence the future course of activity. At the same time, 
the space available to apply countercyclical policies is 
currently more limited than in previous cycles. As to the 
vulnerabilities, high corporate debt, especially in the high-
risk segments, is foremost (see Chart 2.1). There are also 
some signs of overvaluation on financial markets, which 
might bear some relation to the search for higher returns 
at the expense of taking on greater risk.5 With regard to 
economic policy leeway, the expansionary budgetary 
measures approved in late 2017 have appreciably dented 
the public finances, in the opinion of the Congressional 
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1  Notably, compared with the behaviour of the equipment component, residential investment has picked up somewhat in recent 
months, against a background of lower mortgage interest rates, following the weakening of the attendant outlook that had been 
observed some months back. See, for example, Banco de España (2019), “The  slowdown in the US housing market”, Economic 
Bulletin, 1/2019, Box 3.
2  Using aggregate US data since 1970, Emre (2016) has found that poor business earnings usually precede declines in economic 
activity,	 particularly	 influencing	 investment.	 See	 Emre,	 O.	 (2016).	 “Recession probabilities”. Economic Commentary, Cleveland 
Federal Reserve Bank. 
3  International Monetary Fund (2018). “2018 External sector report: tackling global imbalances amid rising trade tensions”, July.
4  Models based on the US sovereign bond yield curve slope estimate that the probability of the US economy going into recession in 
the coming 12 months would be around 35%. However, the predictive power of these models has been called into question in the 
current setting, since term premia are historically compressed by the effect of the expansionary monetary policies adopted globally. 
See Berganza, J. C., and A. Fuertes (2018). “The flattening of the yield curve in the United States”. Economic Bulletin, Banco de 
España 1/2018.
5  International Monetary Fund (2019). “Global Financial Stability Report: Lower for Longer”, October.
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Budget Office (CBO). This might have reduced the fiscal 
space available to absorb any future adverse shock.6 
Moreover, the fiscal impulse associated with these 
measures will be reversed as from 2020, contributing 
negatively to GDP growth (see Chart 2.2). Also, monetary 
policy room for manoeuvre is more limited than in previous 
cycles owing to interest rates being close to their lower 
effective bound.7 
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6	 	Congressional	Budget	Office	(2019).	“The 2019 long-term Budget Outlook”, June.
7  Párraga, S., P. del Río and J. L. Vega (2019). “The Federal Reserve review of its monetary policy framework”, Banco de España, 
Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 4/2019.
SOURCES: Congressional Budget Office and Federal Reserve.
a Loans with a high debt/equity ratio and which entail a high risk of default. EBITDA refers to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation. Quarterly data for 2019.
b Broken lines and shaded bars denote the CBO forecast.
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